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The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion 

Article in Philosophical Psychology · April 2015 

DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.838752 

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Philosophical Psychology, 2013 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.838752 

REVIEW ESSAY 

The limits of Haidt: How his explanation of political animosity fails 

Hugh LaFollette and Michael L. Woodruff 

The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion Jonathan Haidt New York: Pantheon, 2012 448 pages, ISBN: 0307377903 (hbk): $28.95 

Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind seeks to explain why it is difficult for liberals and conservatives to get along. His aim is not just explanatory but also prescriptive. Once we understand that the differences between disputants spring from distinct moral views held by equally sincere people, then we will no longer have reason for deep political animus. Conservatives and Liberals have distinct (although somewhat overlapping) moral views and they understand human nature differently. He claims that these differences are best understood by consulting an array of psychological studies, key genetic findings, and the theoretical underpinnings of sociobiology. After summarizing his arguments, we isolate and discuss the three most important and contentious issues in his book. We argue that although the project’s motivation is noble and some of his findings are insightful, his key explanations, inferences, and prescriptions are wanting. We end by suggesting a way he could defend a weaker version of his view. 

Keywords: Conservatives and Liberals; Genetic Basis of Morality; Harm; Intuition; Political Disagreement; Sanctity; Sociobiology 

1. Introduction 

The stated aim of Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind is to explain “why it’s so hard for us to get along.” His aim, however, is more restricted in scope than this language 

Hugh LaFollette is Cole Chair in Ethics at the University of South Florida, St. Petersburg. Michael L. Woodruff is Professor Emeritus at East Tennessee State University. Correspondence to: Hugh LaFollette, University of South Florida, St. Petersburg, 140 Seventh Ave. S., St. Petersburg, FL 33701, USA. Email: hughlafollette@tampabay.rr.com 

q 2013 Taylor & Francis 

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suggests. He is not explaining obstacles to convivial relations with a reclusive sibling, an arrogant friend, a troublesome child, or an overbearing boss. He wants to explain why it is difficult for liberals and conservatives to get along, more specifically, why it is difficult for American liberals and American conservatives to get along. It may be that a number of his observations and findings are applicable to individual conflicts and political animosities within other countries. However, that is not what prompts this work. He wants to explain why U.S. political rhetoric is so heated. 

Haidt’s aim is not just explanatory but also prescriptive. He thinks that once we understand that differences between disputants spring from distinct moral views held by equally sincere people, then we will no longer have a reason for political animus. If Haidt construes this problem as a reciprocal failure to understand one’s political opponents, then it seems his message would be equally applicable to both sides. However, there is no way to read this book as being addressed equally to liberals and conservatives; it is addressed to liberals. Why? Perhaps he sees himself as a liberal and therefore thinks he will be more effective speaking to like-mind people. He also thinks liberals need to change more than do conservatives. Perhaps, too, he unconsciously thinks liberals are more likely to hear and heed his message. Whatever his rationale, this approach unfortunately means that although he promises to offer a recipe for how warring political opponents can get along, he offers few specific ingredients. 

Before we summarize the main argument, we should note a shift in his language that might cause confusion. His account of liberals and conservatives evolves through the book. Initially he identifies five foundations of morality: harm/care; fairness/ cheating; loyalty/betrayal; authority/subversion; and sanctity/degradation (p. 125). He claims liberals are more concerned with the first two foundations; conservatives are far more concerned with the remaining three. Forty pages later (pp. 167–174) he cites new studies that require modifying his scheme. He subsequently adds a sixth dimension—freedom/oppression—which liberals primarily emphasize. Then he reinterprets fairness—which he had initially treated as reflecting the liberals’ concern with equality—as capturing a conservative concern with proportionality. To simplify the discussion, we focus on his final rendering of the moral foundations rather than alternating between the two versions. 

2. The Structure of Haidt’s Argument 

2.1. The Primacy of Intuition 

Haidt claims there are three broad explanations for the origins of morality. Nativists believe morality is purely innate; its truths are accessed via intuition. Empiricists claim that humans are blank slates at birth; morality emerges from parental or societal instruction. Rationalists believe people ascertain moral principles on their own, using their powers of rational discernment. 

He thinks the dismissal of nativism is premature, although understandable. Specific moral beliefs are not writ in genes such that everyone, everywhere, and at every time endorses the same behaviors. Detailed moral rules vary depending on the evolutionary 

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niches and social constructs of their respective cultures. But Haidt maintains that morality is innate inasmuch as its building blocks are part of human nature. Even the disposition to embrace one moral view rather than another is genetic. A core aim of this book is to identify the moral foundations, briefly explain their genetic origins, and then show how different incarnations of them lead to political animus. 

The first step in achieving this aim is to deflate moral rationalism and elevate moral nativism. That is the core aim of Part I. Haidt begins by offering a phalanx of studies that show that our moral views arise “automatically and almost instantaneously, long before moral reasoning has a chance to get started” (p. xiv). He then offers additional studies which he avers show that moral development theorists of the 70s and 80s give rationality too robust a role. 

The relative roles of intuition and rationality in humans are best thought of as analogous to that between an elephant and its rider. Intuition is the moral elephant; rationality, its rider. The rider falsely thinks that she directs the elephant when, in fact, she serves it, usually by offering post hoc justifications for the person’s intuitive judgments (p. 32). Therefore, what rationalists identify as the core of our moral lives is little more than “clever justifications” of views to which we are antecedently committed. Haidt suggests that the rider (the person’s rationality) should normally address the elephant—the other person’s intuitive side. 

He acquired this insight more than a decade ago during his three week visit to India (pp. 101–102). When he first arrived, he was put off by two elements of many Indian’s moral behavior: their treatment of women and of servants. He was uncomfortable having women standing behind the table, serving the men who ate and talked with other men. He was also leery of treating his house servant as sternly as his Indian hosts urged. However, as he came to know and like those hosts, he came to see the world from their moral perspective. He describes this experience as a “turning point” in his understanding of morality (p. 288). It helped him see that morality is driven more by intuitive responses than by moral deliberation. It was, for him, the first step in recognizing that liberals hold an overly narrow view of morality. 

2.2. Morality is More Than Liberals Think It Is 

Haidt claims that his own studies and the studies of others demonstrate that liberals have an overly narrow view of morality (Part II). Liberals’ moral repertoire is unduly limited to two foundations: preventing harm (bestowing benefits) and constraining oppression (and thus promoting freedom and equality). These same studies show that conservatives embrace four additional moral dimensions that liberals value far less— or not at all: fairness (as proportionality); loyalty; respect for legitimate authority; and sanctity. 

He initially talks about these six features as “moral foundations,” but in an effort to base them in innate, presumably genetic, neural systems, he adapts concepts advanced by Sperber and Hirschfeld (2004) referring to them as “moral modules.” These moral modules are responsible for what Haidt metaphorically calls “universal moral ‘taste’ receptors.” They are, thus, “adaptations to long-standing threats and opportunities in 

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social life” (p. 123). They function similarly to the face detection module (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004) and “draw people’s attention to certain kinds of events” (p. 123). Once attention is drawn, “instant intuitive reactions” are triggered. 

This language, and his use of the concepts proposed by Sperber and Hirschfeld, suggests that he thinks the moral foundations are distinct cognitive modules dependent on separate neuronal mechanisms shaped by particular evolutionary forces. However, an alternative interpretation more accurately matches his emphasis on the fundamental importance of forming groups to human survival and evolution. In this view four of the foundations that the conservatives embrace (proportionality, loyalty, respect for legitimate authority, and sanctity) and liberals (generally) eschew, really spring from a single module, namely, a genetic propensity for groupishness. 

Haidt contends that these moral modules are flexible from person to person in their ability to influence behavior. However, he does not explain how or why they develop as they do. His insistence that each module is directly produced by evolutionary selection is explanatorily flaccid. He could just claim that the moral foundations are biological strategies shaped by social learning to develop and sustain groups. Unfortunately, Haidt does not offer anything more definitive. We know only that each foundation/ module (along with religion) springs from human groupishness. This binds us together, yet also blinds us to the interests of those outside our group. 

2.3. Morality Binds and Blinds 

The core aim of morality is to create cohesive and mutually supportive groups. Haidt is not simply claiming that we are social animals—philosophers since Aristotle have recognized that. Haidt forwards a more robust sense of groupishness—and the four conservative foundations it spawns. He also offers a distinct explanation for its origins. As partially bee-like creatures, we must be loyal to other group members, and we must bow to the queen’s authority. We must do our part to support the hive (proportionality); we must promote the hive’s purity by expelling anything spoiling its environment. 

This aspect of his view is so central to his account that he devotes nearly a third of the book to it. Because his view of the significance of groups is so expansive, he claims we need a potent evolutionary explanation of its origins. Although natural selection working on individuals explains minimal forms of sociality, Haidt claims that it cannot explain full-blown groupishness. To explain that, he appeals to E. O. Wilson’s sociobiology (1975), a supplement to the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis. That synthesis merges population genetics, Mendelian genetics, and paleontology to explain speciation through adaptation via natural selection. Wilson avers that any adequate account of natural selection must also be able to explain human social behavior. 

Historically, sociology explained complex human behavior as arising primarily from cultural transmission. Wilson—and Haidt following him—think this is explanatorily impotent. We should be able to isolate the building blocks or morality in our genes. We cannot do that unless we show how complex human behaviors are 

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chosen via natural selection. That is possible only if selection operates directly on groups and not merely (or even primarily) on individuals. The success of a human group depends on its having enough members who engage in group-promoting activities (D. S. Wilson & Sober, 1994; E. O. Wilson, 1975). If it does, then the group’s fitness increases even if some individual member’s fitness declines. The more its members engage in group-promoting activities, the fitter the group and the higher the probability that its members will produce offspring with alleles producing behaviors that further enhance the group’s evolutionary success. Group selection does not eliminate the gene as the particulate entity transmitting inheritance by reproduction. However, it does reduce individuals to “vectors” carrying the genes that make the group more “fit.” 

As odd as this might initially seem, Haidt thinks this explanation is essential for producing morally robust groupishness. As he puts it: 

At least some of these [evolutionary] innovations were directed at marking members of a moral community, fostering group cohesion, suppressing aggression, and free riding within the group, and defending the territory shared by that moral community. ... Even if group selection played no role in the evolution of any other mammal, human evolution has been so different since the arrival of shared intentionality and gene cultural co-evolution that humans may well be a special case. (p. 212) 

Of course, being capable of being groupish does not mean that one will be groupish. Evolutionary processes produce a “hive switch,” that under certain stimulus conditions is flipped in ways that constrain selfishness and promote group behavior. What can trigger the hive switch? It might be something as simple as synchronized group movements like marching or dance, or being an active spectator at a football game. More centrally to his argument, it is also triggered by religious ritual. That is one reason he thinks religion and morality are so intricately related. 

Haidt suggests that these groupish tendencies are grounded in two physical systems: the action of the neurohormone oxytocin and the brain’s mirror neuron system. Oxytocin, perhaps best known for its effects on lactation, is released by the pituitary gland into the blood stream in response to a variety of stimuli and is used as a neuromodulator by neurons in the brain. It has been shown to promote human social behaviors, especially in promoting attachment to conspecifics (e.g., Churchland & Winkielman, 2012). Additionally, some neurons in the frontal and parietal cortices are active during self-initiated movement and in response to viewing similar actions by others. These “mirror neurons” are thought to promote identification with others (e.g., Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007). 

As we mentioned earlier, Haidt thinks religion directly promotes intragroup coherence. Religious ritual is also a common trigger for the hive switch, which further reinforces groupish behavior. Finally, by “creating” a god who punishes morally errant behavior, religion helps keep most people in moral line. These contributions of religion, Haidt claims, are palpable: religious people are better neighbors, more altruistic, and happier than the liberal counterparts. This should prompt liberals to consider that “conservatives have a better formula ... to create a healthy, happy 

6 H. LaFollette and M. L. Woodruff 

society” (p. 289). This illustrates Haidt’s thesis that conservatives and liberals are influenced by different innate systems. Indeed, he claims work by a group of Australian scientists shows that the predisposition to be conservative or liberal arises from differences in specific identified gene alleles. 

If this is correct, how does Haidt’s account help us get along better with others? If differing political views are genetically based, then it seems his goal of rapprochement between the two groups would be exceedingly difficult. The abstract awareness that we share the “same,” albeit differently specified, moral building blocks seems insufficient to moderate acrimonious dialogue. 

3. Evaluation 

The book raises three central issues that merit discussion. 

1. Does Haidt accurately reflect the current best thinking on the relative roles of 

intuition and reason in moral thought? 2. Does his use of evolutionary biology and genetics offer plausible support for (a) the origins of groupishness, and (b) his claims that genes establish strong political predispositions? 3. Does he plausibly explain why and how we can get along with those who 

advocate radically different political views? 

3.1. Intuitions, Rationality, and Value Pluralism 

Haidt correctly notes that most people make most moral judgments before they deliberate. Some people never rationally reflect on morality, even if they have time. Nonetheless, we have three worries about his characterizations of and inferences from these insights: 1) his criticism of earlier moral psychologists is notably unfair; 2) his criticism of philosophers is partly unfair; and 3) he makes flawed inferences from these findings, in part because he conflates descriptions and prescriptions. 

One, he claims moral development theories are rationalistic (pp. 5–7). However, this is true only in an attenuated sense. Although Kohlberg and Turiel do think some people do, and all people should, rationally evaluate moral actions, it is implausible to claim that they think humans always—or even regularly—do this, or that they think all people do it before acting (Kohlberg, 1981; Turiel, 2002). 

Although this is not a view they expressly develop, Kohlberg and Turiel are plausibly construed as holding that elements of rational moral deliberation occur after the fact, as an audit of previous behavior. Its aim is not ideally to rationalize what we have done, but to rationally evaluate what we did. Having done so, we can then adjust future behavior accordingly. The same is true of successful prudential behavior. We learn to choose a job more wisely, to write more clearly, and to shop more economically by reflecting on our previous choices, paper writing, and spending patterns. 

Moreover, these theories expressly deny that all stages of moral development are rational. In both theories, the early stages of development are decidedly non-rational. Finally, neither Kohlberg nor Turiel think most people—let alone everyone—reaches 

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the higher stages of development where rationality plays a central role. They think many people are stuck at lower levels of moral development. 

His critique of ethicists is not wholly unfair. Some philosophers say, and many more imply, that rationality plays an executive role in moral action: that before we act we do—or should—consciously deliberate. Sometimes that is exactly what we should do. Still, we agree with Haidt that some theorists err in overly rationalizing morality. Normally we do not consciously decide to rescue a drowning child or assist an elderly person who falls while crossing the road. If we pause to deliberate, the child and the elderly person may die. Much moral behavior, e.g., telling the truth, consoling someone whose spouse was murdered, etc., springs “intuitively” from ingrained rules or deeper disposing traits. They do not directly arise from rational deliberation. 

3.1.1. Intentions and rationality Haidt acknowledges that reason has a role in moral thought; its primary aim is to “fabricate” reasons for wholly intuitive action (p. 32). Even when we engage in something resembling rational debate, we should primarily address the elephant, not the rider (chapter 3: “Elephants Rule”). We do not find this satisfactory; the approach sounds more like manipulation than reasoning. 

Although most moral philosophers do give reason a more robust role than Haidt does, few deny intuition’s temporal priority. Most believe that many people’s moral judgments are made quickly, and are typically shaped by parental instruction, the mores of their societies, or their self-interests. These forces are extraordinarily potent. However, rather than infer, as does Haidt, that we should simply accept this fact as an indication of how we should behave, many ethicists aver that we should strive to combat these non-rational influences. We should expose ourselves to opposing views in their most plausible forms. Only then can we overcome familial and social forces that “make a man a Churchman in London ... a Buddhist or a Confucian in Peking” (sic) (Mill, 1985, p. 17). Many deontologists share Mill’s perspective. Kant’s recognition of the power of intuitive forces explains why he thought that being moral is exceedingly difficult. The only way to best inclinations is by having a good will (Kant, 1785/1999, pp. 6–9). 

Put differently, the issue is not whether moral intuitions are temporarily prior to moral judgment; they often are. The issue is whether intuitions are morally authoritative. Are they reliable guides on how we should behave? Some philosophers, like W. D. Ross (1988), think the answer is “yes.” Yet even he thinks rationality is required to know how to balance conflicting prima facie (intuitively grasped) duties. Haidt would doubtless respond, as he has to other similar criticisms, that we mistakenly claim that he gives rationality no moral role. Perhaps some people do think that; we don’t. What we claim is that he gives rationality too small a role, “only in very special circumstances ... when countervailing intuitions have been turned off” (Haidt, 2012b). Unfortunately, intuitions rarely get turned off in such a polarized society. Of course, if disputants can squelch their pretheoretical intuitions, then rationality may reach someone who has been morally recalcitrant. We think rationality can also play a more central role even when a person’s intuitions are active. Each 

8 H. LaFollette and M. L. Woodruff 

author recalls instances where someone’s arguments forced us to reassess our moral views, even when our intuitions (elephants) were at full alert. In short, no one needed to first calm our elephants to address our rationality. In this, we are not alone. 

This example illustrates a troubling feature of his argument. He claims that he is merely describing moral views and behavior (pp. 120 & 221). Yet he often morphs into making prescriptions. He assumes that since he knows how most people make many decisions, he then knows the way people should make them. 

Nowhere is this more obvious than in the six innate foundations. Having conducted studies that suggest that conservatives identify four ethical dimensions that liberals miss or downplay, he infers that morality really includes more than liberals think it does (Part II). He apparently forgets that the mere fact that someone thinks that a belief concerns morality does not make it so. As a teenager, one of the authors supported segregation; for him, the belief that the society should be racially segregated was an unshakeable, intuitive moral truth. However, his moral beliefs were mistaken; instead, they reflected the significant power of parental, religious, and cultural prejudice. 

We suspect that Haidt’s views about the “existence” of the six moral foundations arise from a commitment to a particular form of moral pluralism. 

3.1.2. Pluralism At several points in the book, Haidt claims that there are multiple and sometimes incommensurable, or even wholly incompatible, values. He expressly rejects common consequentialistic or deontological theories because they boil moral deliberation down to a single principle. He raises this objection as if it were radical. Perhaps it is radical among psychologists studying ethics, although we suspect it is not. It is certainly not radical among philosophers (Mason, 2013). Indeed, moral pluralism has probably been the dominant view among philosophers for some years. A number of prominent ethicists have argued not only that we often have incompatible moral values, but that there is no algorithm for deciding how to adjudicate between them (Stocker, 1989). 

Still, Haidt’s understanding of pluralism is unique in two significant respects. One, he claims that the buds of the conservative’s moral palette include authority and sanctity; these are not principles most ethical pluralists countenance. Two, while the philosophical pluralist thinks values are genuinely competing, the American conservatives Haidt studies appear to think that sanctity (almost) always outweighs principles liberals embrace (harm and freedom). If the conservatives gave these latter values serious moral weight, then they would be less inclined to take absolutist stances when sanctity is at stake. Most vehemently condemn gay marriage and abortion. If they really thought sanctity was merely one value balanced against the others (harm and freedom), then in some cases, the latter values would outweigh sanctity. However, that is (almost) never true. This suggests that many conservatives don’t have moral taste buds liberals lack; rather, they have wholly different taste buds. 

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Their four foundations are almost entirely explained by our innate groupishness. That is why his evolutionary explanation of groupishness is key to evaluating his project. 

3.2. Haidt’s Account of the Evolutionary Grounds of Morality 

Haidt postulates that four of the six moral foundations could have arisen only through group selection. Although Wilson and his colleagues identified group selection in bacteria and insects, the empirical evidence for a similar process in humans is thin. All arguments for group selection in humans are vulnerable to three criticisms. 

3.2.1. Three criticisms One, group selection requires promiscuous use of the “adaptationist program” (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). We, as well as Gould and Lewontin, understand that the theory of adaptation is a powerful method for studying evolution (D. S. Wilson, 2000, p. 164). Lewontin (1979), however, has noted that use of either a forward- or backward- looking adaptationist explanation without strong independent empirical evidence lacks explanatory power. In the forward form, an environmental problem is identified and then researchers specify a phenotype to “solve” the problem. In the backward form, scientists isolate a phenotype and then look for environmental forces that might have produced it. 

Haidt’s argument for the existence of religion, and probably the moral foundations that promote groupishness, represent the backward form. Specifically, religion is a behavioral phenotype. Therefore, there must have been some problem that made religion a successful adaptation. The problem: groups needed mechanisms to promote their survival. Therefore there must have been an adaptive phenotype that made that possible. Religion fits the bill: it creates an all-seeing god who encourages groupishness and reduces the tendency to engage in disruptive behaviors even when other members of the group are not present (the “free rider” problem). The explanation sounds vaguely plausible. However, Haidt never considers alternative explanations (like cultural transmission), nor does he consider the possibility of “production of nonadaptive structures by developmental correlation with selected features” (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). Unfortunately, his narrative lacks independent empirical support, unlike the more plausible adaptive explanations for lactose persistence that we discuss later. This makes his argument for the innate basis of the origins of religion, and ultimately for the moral foundations, to have a whiff of circularity. 

Some of Haidt’s arguments are clearly circular. He argues that shared intentionality arose from a major transition in human evolution, stating: 

Homo heidelbergensis is therefore our best candidate for Rubicon crosser. These people had cumulative culture, teamwork, and a division of labor. They must [emphasis added] have had shared intentionality including at least some rudimentary moral matrix and that helped them work together and then share the fruits of their labor. (p. 209) 

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In short, members of Homo heidelbergensis worked together; therefore they must have had shared intentionality. Why? Because shared intentionality led them to work together. 

Two, it is not just that there is no empirical evidence for these adaptive explanations; evolutionist Jerry Coyne thinks they are not experimentally testable: 

Some modern thinkers have constructed elaborate scenarios about how our sense of morality, and many moral tenets, might be the products of natural selection. ... But in the end these ideas come down to untested—and probably untestable— speculations. It’s almost impossible to reconstruct how these features evolved (or even if they are evolved genetic traits) and whether they are direct adaptations or, like making fire, merely the by-products of a complex brain that evolved behavioral flexibility to take care of its body. (2009, p. 230) 

Think, for a moment, about Haidt’s use of oxytocin and mirror neurons to explain the hive switch. Although oxytocin promotes social behaviors, particularly attachment to conspecifics, its function is so broad and in many cases so subtle that it is hard to see how we could test whether it is a toggle “switch” as Haidt avers (Churchland & Winkielman, 2012). Then, although mirror neurons likely play a role is social awareness, it is unclear how we could test whether their increased activity leads to sudden changes from self-centeredness to group-centeredness, particularly since they are active during both self-initiated movements and similar movements produced by others (e.g., Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Uddin et al., 2007). 

Three, appeal to group selection is unnecessary since we can explain most of these morally laden developments as individual adaptations. Therefore, reference to group selection is unparsimonious. Consider one element of groupishness: reciprocal altruism. As Price explains, “individual group members tend to acquire return benefits via their cooperation, by engaging in behaviors that can be regarded as n-person reciprocity or conditional cooperation—competitive altruism—and status-for- altruism transactions” (2012, p. 46). If Price is right, we don’t need group selection to explain some hivish behavior. Whether a more standard selectionist explanation gives Haidt everything he wants is something we explore in the paper’s last section. 

3.2.2. Are genes the source of political orientation? In the final chapters of The Righteous Mind, Haidt seeks to bolster earlier arguments about the six moral foundations by citing studies of twins that indicate that that there is a genetic basis for being conservative or liberal. These studies indicate a degree of heritability of political orientation. However, Haidt overreaches by relying significantly on a paper by Hatemi et al. (2011). In so doing, he suggests that political differences are linked to specific genes: 

After analyzing the DNA of 13,000 Australians, scientists found several genes that differed between liberals and conservatives. Most of these genes were related to neurotransmitter functioning, particularly glutamate and serotonin, both of which are involved in the brains’ response to threat and fear. (pp. 278–279) 

However, Hatemi’s paper does not support this conclusion. 

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Hatemi et al. (2011) used a Genome-Wide Analysis to isolate genes that might be related to conservatism or liberalism. Hatemi’s team identified four chromosomes (2, 4, 6, and 9) with markers that might relate to political divisions. A careful reading of Hatemi’s results would lead many geneticists to reject the markers on chromosomes 6 and 9 since they are outside the standard statistical confidence limits. Hatemi et al. realized this weakness; that is why they made a strong case only for the gene linked to a marker on chromosome 4. This gene was identified as the NMDA receptor-regulated gene 1 (NARG1). NARG1 is expressed at high levels in the neonatal brain and is involved in regulating the proliferation of neurons. It is almost completely turned off in adults. Given the anatomically general distribution of NARG1 action during brain development and its down-regulation in the adult it is unlikely to be involved in production of specific neural modules. Thus, the use by Haidt of the study by Hatemi et al. to support a case for the genetic basis of the conservative/liberal dichotomy appears premature at best, and misleading at worst. 

3.3. Does Haidt Offer Advice That Might Help Us All Get Along? 

In some respects, the answer is “yes.” We are all better off if we can avoid demonizing the other. Far too often we assume that others’ behavior we deem immoral stems from agents’ deeply flawed (if not outright evil) characters. That judgment is detrimental. Of course some people seem preferentially wicked (Milo, 1984). However, we think that is less likely than most of us assume. Much evil stems from a lack of serious self- criticism. However, that does not mean we must conclude that people who demean women are morally no different from those who don’t. They are. These behaviors should be criticized just as others challenged folks like one of the authors, who, in his early years, embraced second class citizenship for blacks and women. 

However, even if we were wrong, his proposed aim of the book will fail, at least if conservatives read his book. The problem is twofold. One, when he is talking about liberals coming to understand conservatives, he is not talking about how liberals might come to understand the run-of-the-mill conservative, that is, a Republican. There are many Republicans with significantly different views and values. Many of these, from the strict libertarian to the self-interested CEO, do not necessarily embrace or find attractive the loyalty or authority or sanctity foundations crucial to fundamentalist conservatives. 

The fundamentalist will object for different reasons. He or she will be appalled by Haidt’s explanation of religious belief and his embrace of sanctity. He derides the “New Atheists” (Harris, Dennett, Hitchens, and Dawkins) for focusing on religionists’ metaphysical claims about the existence of supernatural beings. That, he says, is demeaning to conservatives. We think it is more demeaning to fundamentalists to treat their metaphysical claims about god as a fiction they created to make cohesive societies and to control undesirable behavior. The New Atheists at least give fundamentalists the courtesy of acknowledging that they believe what they say they believe. 

12 H. LaFollette and M. L. Woodruff 

Finally, his analysis of the differences between liberals and conservatives assumes that they embrace fundamentally different values. Certainly some do. However, many differences between these groups’ beliefs arise primarily from different empirical beliefs. For instance, a key element of the conservatives’ beliefs, according to Haidt, is that differences in wealth and influence stem largely from differences in effort. Conservatives are less likely to think that upbringing and institutional structures can influence the ways people’s lives go. Liberals disagree. They think that some people’s life chances are significantly shaped by genetic, economic, social, and familial factors over which they have no control. These different empirical beliefs significantly shape their differences in moral beliefs. 

In such cases, should we talk to other people’s elephants, as Haidt proposes, or their riders? It might be strategically wise to talk to the elephants, although that seems conniving. Generally, we think it is best to frankly point out the other side’s empirical errors. 

4. How Haidt Might Strengthen His Account 

We applaud Haidt’s efforts to soften political rhetoric; we agree that we should spend more effort understanding others and less time demonizing them. We also think he offers important insights about moral behavior. Nonetheless, as we have explained, we have misgivings about key descriptive, and especially prescriptive, claims. 

Perhaps not all is lost. Above we offered several reasons why we find that Haidt has been overly promiscuous in his use of theory and data from evolutionary biology to support his own theory. This is not to say that we reject the importance of evolution in the development of the human mind. However, Haidt’s theory would be better served if he placed more emphasis on the importance of culture in gene-culture coevolution then he does in this book. For example, he makes a great deal of the link between domestication of cattle and the development of lactose tolerance in ancestral Europeans and believes that this example of gene-culture coevolution can be legitimately generalized to explain the emergence of his proposed moral modules. We agree that gene-culture coevolution is explanatorily powerful; we just think it mistakenly assumes that this process requires group selection. Let us explain. 

Most of our ancestors were lactose intolerant; 65% of adults in the world today still cannot digest lactose. This is because following weaning, the enzyme lactase that converts milk into usable sugars becomes inactive. Somewhere between six and eight thousand years ago, pastoral peoples in Europe began to show lactase persistence (LP) and the ability to tolerate lactose as adults (see Gerbault et al., 2011 for a review). This is generally attributed to the domestication of cattle and increased availability of milk. This is not merely a backward form of the adaptationist program; it is a story supported by the archeological and genetic evidence. The archeological evidence shows that adult LP developed after the introduction of dairy farming. Today, LP is associated with groups with a long history of dairy farming. Thus, LP is far lower in southern Europe (15–54%) than in the British Isles and Scandinavia (96%); it is rare in Asian populations (Gerbault et al., 2011). Genetic findings support the 

Philosophical Psychology 13 

anthropological evidence. The frequency of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) that are markers for the alleles that encode lactase persistence increased in our ancestors after they began dairy farming (Gerbault et al., 2011). 

Haidt uses the development of LP to support the proposed selection of the moral foundations at the group level. His assertion is that “if cultural innovations (such as keeping cattle) can lead to a genetic response (such as adult lactose tolerance), then might cultural innovations related to morality have led to genetic responses as well? Yes” (p. 211). This is an unwarranted leap. It is one thing to claim with strong empirical support from replicable data converging from several disciplines that changes in a comparatively simple phenotype (LP), explained by one to three identified alleles, is the consequence of gene-culture co-evolution. It is quite another to extrapolate this evidence to support the claim that cultural pressure on the group is necessary to explain a host of complex human behaviors. 

Further, group selection is not necessary to explain the evolution of LP. Gerbault et al. (2011) propose niche construction theory (NCT) as an alternative to group selection as an explanation for LP. NCT, first advocated by Lewontin (1979), “refers to the activities, choices, and metabolic processes of organisms, through which they define, choose, modify, and partly construct their own niches” (Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feldman, 2000, pp. 132–133 and Tishkoff et al., 2006). A constructed niche then exerts selective pressures on all organisms living in it. 

Further, NCT recognizes that the environments organisms create may also be “passed on” to future generations; they may be sustained and modified by behaviors that are learned vertically between generations and horizontally within them. In the case of humans, this includes the cultural environment. The selective effects of niches are passed along like genes, albeit through a different channel (Laland, Odling-Smee, & Myles, 2010; Odling-Smee, 1988). 

We suspect that NCT could give Haidt part of what he wants. However, it is unclear that that can undergird his insistence (a) that there are four moral foundations liberals miss or downplay, and (b) that religion plays a necessary role in the formation and sustenance of morality. 

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